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NOTE
“Alternative Method Required” and the
Injection of Imaginary Language into the
Missouri Constitution
Cope v. Parson, 570 S.W.3d 579 (Mo. 2019) (en banc).
Calla M. Mears*

I. INTRODUCTION
Mike Kehoe was appointed to Lieutenant Governor of Missouri in 2018
after Michael Parson became Governor of Missouri following the resignation
of Eric Greitens.1 A lawsuit raising interesting questions about the
constitutional process for filling public office vacancies quickly followed the
appointment of Lieutenant Governor Kehoe.2 Article IV, Section 4 of the
Missouri Constitution states: “The governor shall fill all vacancies in public
offices unless otherwise provided by law, and his appointees shall serve until
their successors are duly elected or appointed and qualified.”3 First, what
exactly does the phrase “unless otherwise provided by law” mean in the
context of filling vacancies? Second, what are the legal implications of
allowing the governor to appoint a lieutenant governor when Missouri law
expressly disallows it? Finally, what are some other methods of filling
vacancies that would be constitutional and more democratic?
This Note first outlines the facts and holding of Cope v. Parson - the
case at issue - in Part II. Next, Part III details the legal background,
highlighting principles of constitutional and statutory interpretation. Part III
reviews cases that interpreted the phrase that is the crux of the issue in this
case – “unless otherwise provided by law.” Part IV then summarizes the
*

B.A., University of Missouri, 2017; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri
School of Law, 2021; Editor in Chief, Missouri Law Review, 2020–2021. I would
like to thank Professor Reuben for his insight and guidance during the writing of
this Note, as well as the Missouri Law Review for its assistance in the editorial
process.
1. Office
of
Missouri
Lieutenant
Governor,
Biography,
https://ltgov.mo.gov/biography-mike-kehoe/
[https://perma.cc/MA6W-ZZF4]
(last visited Nov. 16, 2020).
2. Cope v. Parson, 570 S.W.3d 579, 582 (Mo. 2019) (en banc).
3. MO. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
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majority opinion of Cope v. Parson as well as the concurrence in part/dissent
in part. Finally, Part V comments on the various legal implications of the
decision in Cope v. Parson and proposes solutions to the issue.
This Note’s ultimate conclusion is that the majority in Cope v. Parson
erroneously interpreted the phrase “unless otherwise provided by law” to
require an alternative method of filling the lieutenant governor’s vacancy, and
that Section 105.030 sufficiently “otherwise provided by law” a method for
filling the vacancy – leaving it vacant. This Note finally recommends two
democratic solutions: the legislature could pass legislation requiring a special
election in the event that the Office of the Lieutenant Governor becomes
vacant, or it could pass legislation requiring that an alternative method be
provided to fill the vacancy rather than the current “unless otherwise provided
by law.”

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Eric Greitens was sworn in as the fifty-sixth Governor of Missouri on
January 9, 2017.4 Following a string of scandals, Greitens resigned on June
1, 2018.5 Governor Parson served as Missouri’s lieutenant governor from
2017-2018 until Greitens resigned.6 He then took the Office of the Governor
on June 1, 2018, and left the Office of Lieutenant Governor vacant.7 Governor
Parson appointed then-Missouri Senator Mike Kehoe to lieutenant governor
on June 18, 2018.8 Lieutenant Governor Kehoe served in the Missouri Senate
from 2010-2018.9
The Missouri Democratic Party (“MDP”) is the Missouri affiliate of the
United States Democratic Party.10 Darrell Cope is a World War II veteran

4. Jason Hancock, Missouri Gov. Eric Greitens resigns, ending political
career once aimed at presidency, KAN. CITY STAR (May 29, 2018),
https://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-government/article212114314.html.
5. Id.
6. Cope, 570 S.W.3d at 582. Governor Parson previously served in the
Missouri House of Representatives from 2005-2011 and in the Missouri Senate
from 2011-2017.
Missouri Governor, About the Governor,
https://governor.mo.gov/about-governor [https://perma.cc/8T98-UKS4[ (last
visited Feb. 13, 2020).
7. Cope, 570 S.W.3d at 582.
8. Office
of
Missouri
Lieutenant
Governor,
Biography,
https://ltgov.mo.gov/biography-mike-kehoe/ [https://perma.cc/3XM2-SL53] (last
visited Feb. 13, 2020).
9. Id.
10. Party
Bylaws,
MISSOURI
DEMOCRATS,
https://missouridemocrats.org/committees/bylaws/
[https://perma.cc/4FD6VB7W] (last visited Feb. 13, 2020).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol85/iss4/13

2

Mears: “Alternative Method Required” and the Injection of Imaginary Lang

2020] IMAGINARY LANGUAGE IN THE MISSOURI CONSTITUTION

1231

from southern Missouri.11 Cope is a taxpayer12 and citizen of Missouri who
“want[ed] the opportunity to vote for the state’s lieutenant governor, instead
of having him picked ‘in backroom deals.’”13
On the same day that Kehoe was appointed, Cope and the MDP initiated
a lawsuit in Cole County, Missouri against Governor Parson and newlyappointed Lieutenant Governor Kehoe (collectively, “the State”).14 The
petition sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, alleging that the
governor did not have legal authority to appoint a lieutenant governor and that
the office should remain vacant until the 2020 election.15 The State filed a
motion to dismiss.16 First, they argued that Cope – as a private litigant – did
not have authority to remove the lieutenant governor from office.17 Next, they
argued that neither Cope nor the MDP had standing to bring the lawsuit.18
Finally, they argued that the governor had authority under Article IV, Section
4 of the Missouri Constitution to appoint a lieutenant governor.19
The trial court held a hearing for the State’s motion to dismiss.20 At the
hearing, Cope and the MDP withdrew their request for injunctive relief, but
preserving their request for declaratory judgment challenging the validity of
the governor’s appointment of Kehoe.21 The trial court sustained the State’s
motion to dismiss on the ground that Cope and the MDP had neither taxpayer
nor associational standing to challenge the governor’s appointment.22 Cope
and the MDP appealed the trial court’s decision to the Supreme Court of
Missouri.23 At issue on direct appeal was the substantive question of whether
the governor had authority to appoint Kehoe.24 The Supreme Court of
11. Marshall Griffin, Missouri Lawyers Argue Over Validity of Lieutenant
Governor Appointment, ST. LOUIS PUB. RADIO (July 5, 2018),
https://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/missouri-lawyers-argue-over-validitylieutenant-governor-appointment#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/7ZCT-XKMW].
12. The fact that Cope is a taxpayer is relevant because he sued under the
theory of taxpayer standing.
13. Griffin, supra note 11.
14. Cope v. Parson, 570 S.W.3d 579, 582 (Mo. 2019) (en banc).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 582–83.
21. Id. at 583.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. There were two other issues raised: whether Cope and the MDP had
standing and whether their request for declaratory judgment called for a
nonjusticiable advisory opinion. Id. at 583. The Court determined that Cope had
taxpayer standing because the Governor’s appointment would require the
expenditure of tax revenue to fund the Lieutenant Governor’s office. Id. at 584.
The Court did not address the MDP’s associational standing because it established
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Missouri concluded that Governor Parson had the authority to appoint Kehoe
to the Office of Lieutenant Governor.25 The court’s rationale was that the
governor is permitted to fill all public office vacancies unless an alternative
method is provided by law, and Section 105.030 of the Missouri Revised
Statutes does not provide an alternative method.26

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Article IV, Section 4 of the Missouri Constitution provides: “The
governor shall fill all vacancies in public offices unless otherwise provided by
law, and his appointees shall serve until their successors are duly elected or
appointed and qualified.”27 The clause “unless otherwise provided by law”
was added to the provision in 1875.28
Section 105.030.1 of the Missouri Revised Statutes provides guidance
for how vacancies in public offices may be filled.29 The statute provides that
when
any vacancy, caused in any manner or by any means whatsoever,
occurs or exists in any state or county office originally filled by
election of the people, other than in the offices of lieutenant governor,
state senator or representative, sheriff, or recorder of deeds in the City
of St. Louis, the vacancy shall be filled by appointment by the
governor.”30

Section 105.030.2 further provides that vacancies in any county offices
may be filled by the appointment of a county commission.31

A. Principles of Constitutional Interpretation
When interpreting the Missouri Constitution, the Supreme Court of
Missouri must “ascribe to the words of a constitutional provision the meaning
that the people understood them to have when the provision was adopted.”32
that Cope had taxpayer standing. Id. Further, the Court determined that the claim
presented a justiciable controversy by Cope having taxpayer standing so the
opinion would not be advisory in nature. Id. at 586.
25. Id. at 586.
26. Id. at 585.
27. MO. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
28. MO. CONST. of 1875 art. 5, § 11. The Missouri Constitution of 1875
contained substantially the same provisions as the current Missouri Constitution,
while the Missouri Constitution of 1820 did not contain the words “unless
otherwise provided by law.” MO. CONST. of 1820 art. 4, § 9.
29. MO. REV. STAT. § 105.030 (2018).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Farmer v. Kinder, 89 S.W.3d 447, 452 (Mo. 2002) (en banc).
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The court is to assume that every word in a constitutional provision has
meaning.33 When words do not have a legal or technical meaning, the court
must apply their plain or ordinary meaning, unless doing so would “defeat the
manifest intent of the constitutional provision.”34

B. Previous Statute Challenged under Article IV, Section 4
A statute’s constitutionality under Article IV, Section 4 of the Missouri
Constitution has only been determined once before Cope v. Parson.35 In
Labor’s Educational and Political Club Independent et al. v. Danforth, the
Court held that Section 130.070(1), part of the Missouri Campaign Finance
and Disclosure Act (“the Act”), was unconstitutional.36 Missouri voters
passed the Act by a ballot initiative, and it contained various campaign finance
and disclosure regulations.37 Section 130.070(1) of the Act “void[ed] an
election where violations of the Act occur, or if it is impossible to hold a
special election prohibit[ed] the guilty candidate from becoming a candidate
for any public office for ten years.”38 The court held that the ten-year
prohibition was unconstitutional in that it created an eligibility requirement
for public office in addition to those outlined in the Missouri Constitution.39
The plaintiffs in Danforth further challenged the Act as a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution, because violators
of the Act running for positions where a special election could be held were
not subject to the same eligibility requirement.40 To satisfy the equal
protection clause, a strict scrutiny test required the government to provide a
compelling interest for the classification.41 The State argued, “because there
is no authority to hold special elections for some public offices, these offices
would be left vacant if voiding an election would be the government’s only
recourse for a violation of the Act, and this would be of little or no benefit to
the public,” but the State did not name any specific offices.42 The court found
that Section 130.070(1) violated the Fourteenth Amendment because the
discrepancy that few if any offices – other than that of the lieutenant governor
– would stay vacant in Missouri.43

33. City of Arnold v. Tourkakis, 249 S.W.3d 202, 206 (Mo. 2008) (en banc).
34. Missouri Prosecuting Attorneys v. Barton Cty., 311 S.W.3d 737, 742
(Mo. 2010) (en banc).
35. See Cope v. Parson, 570 S.W.3d 579, 584 n.4 (Mo. 2019) (en banc).
36. Labor’s Educ. And Political Club Indep. v. Danforth, 561 S.W.2d 339,
342 (Mo. 1977) (en banc).
37. Id. at 343.
38. Id. at 344.
39. Id. at 345.
40. Id. at 348.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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C. Interpreting “Unless Otherwise Provided by Law”
Three cases have interpreted the phrase “unless otherwise provided by
law” in different contexts, and the results were mixed. First, State ex rel. St.
Joseph Lead Co. v. Jones confronted the venue question of whether a suit by
summons could be instituted against an out-of-state business licensed to do
business in Missouri in a county other than where the cause of action
happened or where the company keeps an office or agent to conduct usual
business.44 The relevant statutes were Section 1751 and 1754.45 Section 1751
stated that lawsuits “instituted by summons shall, except as otherwise
provided by law, be brought . . . when all the defendants are nonresidents of
the state, suit may be brought in any county in this state.”46 Section 1754
stated that lawsuits “against corporations shall be commenced either in the
county where the cause of action accrued . . . or in any county where such
corporations shall have or usually keep an office or agent for the transaction
of their usual and customary business.”47 The court noted that Section 1751,
by the express terms “except otherwise provided by law,” indicated that there
was no legislative intent for the Section to “prevail over any conflicting
statute.”48 The court found that Section 1754 was controlling because it
provided a rule about venue that superseded Section 1751.49
Another Missouri case, Becker Glove Int’l v. Jack Dubinsky & Sons
determined whether a compulsory counterclaim rule applied to an action filed
in an associate circuit division.50 In Becker, a commercial landlord sued a
tenant over nonpayment of rent.51 The tenant withheld rent in response to the
landlord failing to provide a heating system maintaining a temperature as
required by the lease.52 No counterclaims or responsive pleadings were made,
the tenant paid the rent while the action was pending, and the landlord won
the case.53 The tenant went on to make improvements to the heating system
then demanded payment from the landlord.54 When the landlord refused to

44. State ex rel. St. Joseph Lead Co. v. Jones, 192 S.W. 980, 980 (Mo. 1917)
(en banc).
45. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 1751, 1754 (1909).
46. MO. REV. STAT. § 1751 (1909).
47. MO. REV. STAT. § 1754 (1909).
48. Jones, 192 S.W. at 981.
49. Id. This case was relied on by the dissent in Cope v. Parson, but the
majority expressly declined to follow it. Cope v. Parson, 570 S.W.3d 579, 585
n.4 (Mo. 2019) (en banc).
50. Becker Glove Int’l v. Jack Dubinsky & Sons, 41 S.W.3d 885, 886 (Mo.
2001) (en banc).
51. Id. at 886–87.
52. Id. at 886.
53. Id. at 887.
54. Id.
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pay, the tenant sued the landlord for breach of the lease.55 One of the
landlord’s defenses was that the tenant was required to bring the action as a
counterclaim to the landlord’s suit.56
The relevant statute, Section 517.021, said that the rules of civil
procedure “shall apply to cases or classes of cases to which this chapter is
applicable, except where otherwise provided by law.”57 The Court held that
“except where otherwise provided by law” included Section 517.031, a statute
that had different procedural requirements from those in the rules of civil
procedure.58 Section 517.031 specifically did not require a responsive
pleading or counterclaim for a claim to proceed.59 The court found Section
517.031 to be controlling because its provisions were consistent with chapter
517’s purpose “to simplify matters initially filed in an associate circuit
division.”60
Finally, Marx v. General Revenue Corp. is a federal case that interpreted
“provides otherwise” in the context of awarding costs.61 The rule at issue was
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1), which states that costs other than
attorney’s fees should be awarded to the prevailing party “[u]nless a federal
statute, these rules or a court order provides otherwise.”62 The Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) provides that courts may award costs to
defendants when “an action under this section was brought in bad faith and
for the purpose of harassment.”63 The United States Supreme Court
determined that the FDCPA did not exclusively “provide otherwise,” meaning
a court can award costs to prevailing defendants in FDCPA cases in the
absence of a finding that the plaintiff brought the claim in bad faith to harass
the defendant.64 The Court reasoned that a statute “provides otherwise” than
Rule 54(d)(1) if it is “contrary” to the Rule.65 Because the context of the
FDCPA indicated a lack of congressional intent to prohibit courts from
awarding costs under Rule 54(d)(1), the FDCPA was not contrary to the
Rule.66
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. MO. REV. STAT. § 517.021 (2000). Missouri Rule of Civil Procedure
41.01(d) similarly stated that “civil actions pending in the associate circuit
division shall be governed by Rules 41 through 101 except where otherwise
provided by law.” Mo. R. Civ. P. 41.01(d).
58. Becker, 41 S.W.3d at 887.
59. Id. at 888.
60. Id. at 888. Section 517.031.1 stated in relevant part, “The pleadings of
the petition shall be informal unless the court in its discretion requires formal
pleadings.” MO. REV. STAT. § 517.031.1 (2000).
61. Marx v. Gen. Rev. Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 373, 373–74 (2013).
62. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1).
63. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3) (2012).
64. Marx, 568 U.S. at 374.
65. Id. at 377.
66. Id. at 373, 381.
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D. Principles of Statutory Interpretation
While rules of constitutional interpretation often intersect with rules of
statutory interpretation, there are a few key differences. Rules of statutory
interpretation are more comprehensive, and there are several of them. Many
of these rules are outlined in the Uniform Statute and Rule Construction Act
(“USRCA”).67 The first, and probably most prominent, of these rules is the
plain meaning rule.

1. Plain Meaning Rule
The plain meaning rule is typically used as a starting point for statutory
interpretation. Once the dominant approach to legislative interpretation,68 the
rule asserts that “where the language of an enactment is clear and construction
according to its terms does not lead to absurd or impracticable consequences,
the words employed are to be taken as the final expression of the meaning
intended.”69 The essential purpose of the rule is to deny any need to
“interpret” unambiguous language.70 The plain meaning rule is difficult to
apply consistently because determining whether language is unambiguous is
ultimately subjective.71 This problem is further exacerbated by the courts –
ironically – finding different meaning for the plain meaning rule and
“indiscriminately citing these cases alongside ‘pure’ plain meaning cases as
though all stood for the same thing.”72 The United States Supreme Court has
sometimes referred to the plain meaning rule as having an even higher
standard, holding in United States v. Oregon that there was no need to turn to
legislative history when provisions were “clear and unequivocal on their
face.”73 The plain meaning rule is rarely used alone, as the Supreme Court
almost always looks at the legislative history as well.74

2. Dictionary Definitions and Common Usage
Statutory language with meaning that is not immediately obvious to
satisfy the plain meaning rule may be determined by looking to dictionary
definitions and common usage of the language. Section 2 of the USRCA

67. UNIF. STATUTE & RULE CONSTR. ACT (1995).
68. Arthur W. Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The “Plain-Meaning Rule”
and Statutory Interpretation in the “Modern” Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REV.
1299, 1299 (1975).
69. United States v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929).
70. Murphy, supra note 68, at 1299.
71. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 496–497 (1917) (McKenna,
J., dissenting).
72. Murphy, supra note 68, at 1302.
73. Id. at 1303.
74. Id.
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states that “[u]nless a word or phrase is defined in the statute or rule being
construed, its meaning is determined by its context, the rules of grammar, and
common usage.”75 Section 2 further says “[a] word or phrase that has acquired
a technical or particular meaning in a particular context has the meaning if it
is used in that context.”76 Dictionaries are generally allowed in court “as aids
to the memory and understanding of the court.”77 Context may also be used
to determine statutory meaning.78 “Context” as described in the Dictionary
Act means the text of the Act of Congress surrounding the word at issue, or
the texts of other related congressional Acts, and this is simply an instance of
the word’s ordinary meaning.79
An example of dictionary usage in interpreting statutory language is
found in Muscarello v. United States.80 The challenged phrase in the statute
was “carries a firearm” and the issue was whether that phrase was limited to
carrying a firearm on someone’s person or if it included carrying a firearm in
a vehicle.81 The parties did not dispute that Congress intended the phrase to
convey an ordinary meaning rather than a legal term of art, so the United
States Supreme Court turned to dictionary definitions.82 Two of the three
definitions of “carries” included “in a vehicle,” and the third definition did not
expressly exclude carrying by vehicle.83 The Court also looked to the origin
of the word “carries,” tracing it to the Latin “carum,” meaning “car” or
“cart.”84 The Court ultimately concluded that “carries” included carrying a
firearm in a vehicle.85

75. UNIF. STATUTE & RULE CONSTR. ACT § 2, (1995).
76. Id.
77. Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304, 307 (1893).
78. Rowland v. California Men’s Colony, Unit II Men’s Advisory Council,
506 U.S. 194, 199 (1993).
79. Rowland v. Cal. Men’s Colony, Unit II Men’s Advisory Council, 506
U.S. 194, 199 (1993) (The dictionary definition of “context” means ”[t]he part or
parts of a discourse preceding or following a ‘text’ or passage or a word, or so
intimately associated with it as to throw light upon its meaning.” (citing
Webster’s New International Dictionary 576 (2d ed. 1942))).
80. Id. at 128.
81. Id. at 126–127.
82. Id. at 128.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 139.
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3. Clear Statement Requirements and Preemption
There are three general categories of statutory interpretation canons.86
The first and second are “referential” canons and “linguistic” canons.87
Canons within those categories often have counter-canons, rendering them
less meaningful than the third, more consistent category – “substantive”
canons. Canons in this third category are not policy neutral and represent
value choices by the Court.88 Clear statement rules fall into the substantive
canons.89 These set of rules are of the newest rules of interpretation and some
of the most stringent.90 Essentially, they require a clearer, more explicit
statement from Congress in the text of the statute – without reference to
legislative history – than prior clear statement rules required.91
The clear statement rules were initially established in Pennhurst State
School and Hospital v. Halderman.92 The Court said its canon “applies with
greatest force where, as here, a State’s potential obligations under the Act are
largely indeterminate,” and emphasized that the “crucial inquiry . . . is
whether Congress spoke so clearly that we can fairly say that the State could
make an informed choice” to assume the obligations mentioned.93 Modern
clear statement rules are powerful – “[a]t their strongest, [they] treat all
statutes as maintaining the status quo unless Congress clearly states its
contrary intention in the text of the statute.”94 They eliminate all need to use
the purpose, history, or structure of statute to determine congressional intent,
because they “foreclose inquiry into extrinsic guides of interpretation.”95
Further, the clear statement rules create strong statutory interpretation
presumptions that can only be rebutted with unambiguous statutory language
addressing the particular issue.96

86. William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional
Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593,
595 (1992).
87. “Referential” canons involve rules referring to preexisting or outside
sources to determine meaning, and “linguistic” canons look to grammar and
syntax. Id.
88. Id. at 595–96.
89. Id. at 595.
90. Id. at 597.
91. Id.
92. See Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1
(1981).
93. Eskridge, Jr. & Frickey, supra note 86, at 620 (quoting Halderman, 451
U.S. at 24-25).
94. John Nagle, Waiving Sovereign Immunity in an Age of Clear Statement
Rules, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 771, 772 (1995).
95. Id.
96. Eskridge, Jr. & Frickey, supra note 86, at 611–12.
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The basic rule against preemption is that a governmental entity may not
act contrary to rules set by a controlling governmental body.97 In Summer v.
Teaneck, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that a municipality cannot
contradict a state legislative policy.98 Therefore “an ordinance will fall if it
permits what a statute expressly forbids or forbids what a statute expressly
authorizes.”99 Further, “[e]ven absent such evident conflict, a municipality
may be unable to exercise a power it would otherwise have if the Legislature
has preempted the field.”100 Ultimately, the question “is whether, upon a
survey of all the interests involved in the subject, it can be said with
confidence that the Legislature intended to immobilize the municipalities
from dealing with local aspects otherwise within their power to act.”101

IV. INSTANT DECISION
The Supreme Court of Missouri held that Governor Parson had authority
to appoint a lieutenant governor.102 The majority opinion, authored by Chief
Justice Zel Fischer, determined that the “plain, ordinary meaning” of the
phrase “unless otherwise provided by law” allows the governor to “fill all
vacancies in public offices unless another way of filling the vacancy is
furnished by law.”103 The majority looked to the Webster’s New International
Dictionary to determine that “otherwise” means “in a different manner, in
another way, or in other ways” and that to “provide” means to “furnish [or]
supply.”104 The majority further held that an intent for the listed offices in
Section 105.030 to remain vacant cannot be inferred because “the law
provides a way to fill every office expressly mentioned in the statute apart
from Lieutenant Governor.”105
The majority relied on Overcast v. Billings Mutual Insurance Co. to
determine that preemption cannot be inferred when the legislature does not do
so.106 In Overcast, the plaintiff sued his insurance company after it refused to
pay when his home was destroyed by a fire.107 The insurance company

97. For example, local government cannot act contrary to state law. Summer
v. Teaneck, 251 A.2d 761, 764 (N.J. 1969).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 764–65.
102. Cope v. Parson, 570 S.W.3d 579, 585 (Mo. 2019) (en banc).
103. Id. at 584–85.
104. Id. at 585 n.4.
105. Id. at 585. Different statutes provide for methods to fill the positions of
state legislator, sheriff, county commissioners, and the St. Louis city recorder of
deeds. Id.
106. Id. (citing Overcast v. Billings Mut. Ins. Co., 11 S.W.3d 62, 69 (Mo.
2000) (en banc)).
107. Overcast, 11 S.W.3d at 64.
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maintained that the “loss resulted from an intentional act” committed by the
plaintiff.108 After a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, he was awarded
contract damages for insurance coverage and actual and punitive damages for
a tort claim of defamation.109 On appeal, the insurance company claimed that
the court should not have awarded damages to the plaintiff for defamation
because Section 375.420 “provides enhanced recovery for an insurance
company’s vexatious refusal to pay [and] preempts all other claims.”110 The
Supreme Court of Missouri rejected this argument, affirming the judgment of
the trial court.111 The Supreme Court of Missouri instead found that Section
375.420 “does not purport to preempt the common law breach of contract
remedy but only to add to that remedy.”112
The majority briefly touched on the policy argument that the “power to
appoint cannot be abrogated by mere implication” because there is value in
preserving the “uninterrupted functioning of the government.”113 Finally, the
majority held that Article IV, Section 4 controls the governor’s authority to
make appointments because Cope and the MDP did not dispute the fact that
no alternative methods of filling vacancies is provided by law.114
Joined by Judge Patricia Breckenridge, Judge George Draper concurred
in part and dissented in part to the majority’s opinion.115 Draper concurred
only to the majority’s finding that Cope and the MDP had standing and that
the petition for declaratory judgment did not call for a nonjusticiable advisory
opinion.116 He dissented to the majority’s determination that the governor was
permitted to fill the vacancy of the Office of Lieutenant Governor by
appointment.117 Draper argued that the legislature “otherwise provided” by

108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 66. Section 375.420 reads as follows:
In any action against any insurance company to recover the amount of any loss
under a policy of automobile, fire, cyclone, lightning, life, health, accident,
employers’ liability, burglary, theft, embezzlement, fidelity, indemnity, marine or
other insurance except automobile liability insurance, if it appears from the
evidence that such company has refused to pay such loss without reasonable cause
or excuse, the court or jury may, in addition to the amount thereof and interest,
allow the plaintiff damages not to exceed twenty percent of the first fifteen
hundred dollars of the loss, and ten percent of the amount of the loss in excess of
fifteen hundred dollars and a reasonable attorney’s fee; and the court shall enter
judgment for the aggregate sum found in the verdict.
MO. REV. STAT. § 375.420 (2000).
113. Cope v. Parson, 570 S.W.3d 579, 585 (Mo. 2019) (en banc).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 586–87.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 587.
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enacting Section 105.030, which plainly stated that the governor is not
authorized to fill
any vacancy, caused in any manner or by any means whatsoever,
occurs or exists in any state or county office originally filled by
election of the people, other than in the offices of lieutenant governor,
state senator or representative, sheriff, or recorder of deeds in the City
of St. Louis, the vacancy shall be filled by appointment by the
governor.118

He conceded that Section 105.030 does not provide an alternative
method but argued that the majority failed to analyze the language in the
constitution and instead injected language into it that does not exist.119 He
went on to say that “[t]here is no language stating the governor shall fill public
vacancies unless otherwise provided by law and [emphasis original] an
alternative method is provided.120 Draper further argued that an alternative
method did exist – the position could remain vacant until the 2020 election.121
He stated that the Supreme Court of Missouri has found for over 100 years
that “otherwise provided by law” means “unless otherwise provided by
statute.”122 Draper reiterated that “[n]either the constitution nor statutes
indicate, mandate, state, or require there must [emphasis original] be an
alternative means to fill a public office vacancy.”123

V. COMMENT
The crux of the issue in this case is the meaning of the phrase “unless
otherwise provided by law” in the Missouri Constitution. The Missouri
General Assembly has the express authority to dictate how vacancies are filled
when the Missouri Constitution does not otherwise prescribe a method.124

A. The Missouri Legislature Could Have Added “Unless an
Alternative Method Is Provided” Language
The Missouri Constitution expressly states that the governor may fill
vacancies for certain positions – including that of lieutenant governor – unless
otherwise provided by law.125 The Missouri Constitution does not include any
language saying that the governor may fill vacancies unless some alternative

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.; MO. REV. STAT. § 105.030.1 (2018).
Cope, 570 S.W.3d at 587.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
MO. CONST. art. VII, § 7.
MO. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
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method is provided.126 Unlike Missouri, several state constitutions do
expressly state that an alternative method is required for a statute to supersede
the state’s governor’s ability to fill vacancies.127
Arizona’s constitution says that the governor may make an appointment
“when any office shall, from any cause, become vacant, and no mode shall be
provided.”128 “[W]hen any office, from any cause, may become vacant, and
no mode is provided by the Constitution and laws for filling such vacancy,”
Arkansas allows appointments by the governor.129 Iowa defers to governor
appointments “when any office shall, from any cause, become vacant, and no
mode is provided by the constitution and laws for filling such vacancy.”130
“[I]n all cases, not otherwise provided for in this constitution, the Legislature
may determine the mode of filling all vacancies” in Mississippi.131 The
governor may appoint someone to a position “when any Office shall, from
any cause become vacant and no mode is provided by the Constitution and
laws for filling such vacancy” in Nevada.132 “[W]hen any State or district
office shall become vacant, and no mode is provided by the Constitution and
laws for filling such vacancy,” the governor of Utah may fill the vacancy.133
Finally, in Wyoming, the governor may appoint to fill vacancies “when any
office from any cause becomes vacant, and no mode is provided by the
constitution or law for filling such vacancy.”134 When comparing the
language of Missouri’s constitution to that of the states mentioned above, it is
obvious that the drafters of the Missouri Constitution would have included
language requiring an alternative method to prevent the governor from filling
vacancies if it desired that to be the law.
Only the seven states mentioned have some kind of alternative method
requirement. Other states either explicitly provide for a method of filling
vacancies in the constitution itself or have statutory provisions “otherwise
providing by law” how to fill vacancies. For example, Alabama’s constitution
requires Alabama’s senate president pro tem to succeed to the position of
lieutenant governor until an election can be held.135 California’s constitution
mandates that the legislature must provide an order of succession in the event
that the lieutenant governor succeeds to the governorship.136 Other states
126. Id.
127. See ARIZ. CONST. art. V, § 8; ARK. CONST. art. VI, § 23; IOWA CONST.
art. IV, § 10; MISS. CONST. art. IV, § 103; NEV. CONST. art. V, § 8; UTAH CONST.
art. VII, § 9; WYO. CONST. art. IV, § 7; CAL. CONST. art. V, § 5; COLO. CONST.
art. 4, § 6.
128. ARIZ. CONST. art. V, § 8.
129. ARK. CONST. art. VI, § 23.
130. IOWA CONST. art. IV, § 10.
131. MISS. CONST. art. IV, § 103.
132. NEV. CONST. art. V, § 8.
133. UTAH CONST. art. VII, § 9.
134. WYO. CONST. art. IV, § 7.
135. ALA. CONST. art. V, § 127.
136. CAL. CONST. art. V, § 10.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol85/iss4/13

14

Mears: “Alternative Method Required” and the Injection of Imaginary Lang

2020] IMAGINARY LANGUAGE IN THE MISSOURI CONSTITUTION

1243

allow the governor to make appointments to fill vacancies in the office of
lieutenant governor without any possibility that the legislature may provide
otherwise.137 In Colorado, the governor may appoint someone to fill the office
of lieutenant governor, and the appointment is subject to approval by the
legislature.138

B. The Legislature Intended to Preempt the Governor’s Authority to
Appoint
The majority opinion used Overcast v. Billings Mutual Insurance Co. to
determine that courts do not need to infer a preemption when the legislature
does not say so clearly.139 The majority claimed that Cope and the MDP asked
the Court to infer such a preemption.140 Overcast is not directly on point in
this case. It held that when “the legislature intends to preempt a common law
claim, it must do so clearly.”141 Overcast did not speak to whether the
legislature must be as clear when preempting a provision in the Missouri
Constitution that it was expressly permitted to preempt.142 Still, there is no
need to make the inference because the language in Section 105.030 plainly
states that the governor lacks authority to appoint a lieutenant governor when
it says,
Whenever any vacancy, caused in any manner or by any means
whatsoever, occurs or exists in any state or county office originally
filled by election of the people, other than in the offices of lieutenant
governor, state senator or representative, sheriff, or recorder of deeds
in the City of St. Louis, the vacancy shall be filled by appointment by
the governor.143

137. See COLO. CONST. art. IV, § 13.
138. Id.
139. Cope v. Parson, 570 S.W.3d 579, 585 (Mo. 2019) (en banc).
140. Id.
141. Overcast v. Billings Mut. Ins. Co., 11 S.W.3d 62, 69 (Mo. 2000) (en
banc). “Preemption” is the principle that one law can “supersede or supplant any
inconsistent . . . law or regulation.” Preemption, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(11th ed. 2019). In this context, preemption happens when the legislature passes
a law that will supersede or supplant state common law. See Overcast v. Billings
Mut. Ins. Co., 11 S.W.3d 62 (Mo. 2000) (en banc).
142. See Overcast, 11 S.W.3d at 62.
143. MO. REV. STAT. § 105.030.1 (2018).
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C. Allowing the Office of Lieutenant Governor to Remain Vacant
Would Not Cause Harm
The majority and the State expressed concern for leaving the Office of
Lieutenant Governor vacant.144 In the State’s brief, it gave several policy
arguments for allowing the governor to make an appointment and emphasized
the importance of the role of lieutenant governor.145 The lieutenant governor
does serve two important functions: acting as a tiebreaker for the Missouri
Senate and being available as the next successor to the Office of the
Governor.146 The State listed various boards the lieutenant governor serves
on, including the Board of Fund Commissioners and the Board of Public
Funds.147 While the lieutenant governor’s service on the various boards is not
trivial, it is also not crucial to the functioning of the state government. Further,
each board has other members that would continue to operate the board in the
absence of the lieutenant governor.
The State makes a slightly stronger argument that the lieutenant
governor breaks ties in the Senate.148 Still, all that would happen in the
absence of a tiebreaker in the Senate is that a bill may not pass, which is
already one of the two potential results even with a lieutenant governor.149
The “strong presumption” in favor of filling vacancies is not justified by the
State’s reasoning because the functions of the Office of the Lieutenant
Governor are not vital.150 Further, the duties of the lieutenant governor have
remained largely unchanged, as those duties are enumerated in the Missouri
Constitution.151
Historically, Missouri has survived several years of vacancies in the
Office of the Lieutenant Governor. The first vacancy was from July 1825,
when Lieutenant Governor Reeves resigned, until January 1828, when
Lieutenant Governor Dunklin was inaugurated.152 The second vacancy took
place between August 1855, when Governor Brown died, and August 1856,
144. Cope, 570 S.W.3d at 585; Respondent’s Brief at 39–42, Cope v. Parson,
570 S.W.3d 579 (Mo. 2019) (en banc) 2018 WL 4467224, at *39-42
145. Respondent’s Brief at *12.
146. Id.
147. Id. at *12–13. The Lieutenant Governor also serves on the Missouri
Community Service Commission, the Missouri Development Finance Board, the
Missouri Housing Development Commission, the Missouri State Capitol
Commission, the Tourism Commission, and the Special Health, Psychological,
and Social Needs of Minority Older Individuals Commission. Id.
148. Id.
149. Appellant’s Reply Brief at 9, Cope v. Parson, 570 S.W.3d 579 (Mo. 2019)
(en banc) 2018 WL 4928953, at *8–9.
150. Id. at *9.
151. MO. CONST. art. IV, § 10.
152. Lieutenant
Governors,
Missouri
History,
https://www.sos.mo.gov/archives/history/historicallistings/ltgov.asp
[https://perma.cc/KUP3-F8X5].
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when Lieutenant Governor Jackson was elected.153 The office was again
vacant for a brief period in 1861 as the lieutenant governor at that time,
Thomas Caute Reynolds, was a secessionist driven into exile.154 There was
another vacancy between April 1872, when Lieutenant Governor Gravely
died, until the November 1872 general election.155 Another vacancy took
place between 1887, when Lieutenant Governor Morehouse became governor
following the death of Governor Marmaduke, and the inauguration of
Lieutenant Governor Claycomb in 1889.156 There was a brief vacancy from
December 1944, when Lieutenant Governor Harris died, to January 1945,
when the newly-elected Lieutenant Governor Davis was inaugurated.157
Finally, Lieutenant Governor-Elect Maxwell was appointed to the vacant
office to serve until his inauguration in January 2001.158

D. Allowing the Governor to Appoint A Lieutenant Governor Is
Undemocratic
The lieutenant governor has very few duties enumerated in the Missouri
Constitution.159 The lieutenant governor acts as ex officio160 president of the
Missouri Senate, participates in legislative committees, and breaks ties for the
Senate.161 Fundamental to the position is democratic election, because the
person who breaks ties in the Senate must be someone elected statewide. The
holding in the instant case allows for a partisan result by giving the governor
the power to decide who breaks the tie. Further, when the governor can
appoint someone to lieutenant governor, it becomes possible for the highest
public office to become inhabited by someone who was not chosen by the
people of Missouri.
There is no sign that the drafters of the Missouri Constitution intended
the governor to fill a vacancy in the office of lieutenant governor by
appointment.162 On the contrary, the drafters modified a provision from the
previous Missouri Constitution that provided that “[w]hen any office shall
become vacant, the governor shall appoint a person to fill such vacancy, who
shall continue in office until a successor be duly appointed and qualified

153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See MO. CONST. art. IV, § 10.
160. A member ex officio is someone who serves on a board or committee by
virtue of holding an office, and whose membership will therefore pass with the
office to his or her successor. Member ex officio, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(11th ed. 2019).
161. Id.
162. See Journal of the Constitutional Convention of Missouri—1943 (1943).
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according to law” to include “unless otherwise provided by law.”163 This
addition of the phrase “unless otherwise provided by law” suggests that the
drafters chose not to allow the governor to make appoints to fill the position.
It further suggests that the drafters were purposeful about requiring the extra
check on the executive branch by requiring an election for the lieutenant
governor position. Further, the lieutenant governor was not even required to
come from the same party as the governor.164
Judge Draper argued in the dissent that there is an alternative method of
filling the vacancy, waiting until the next election.165 One similar solution
could be enacting a statute, or proposing a constitutional amendment, creating
an order of succession to the Office of the Lieutenant Governor. For example,
the Missouri Constitution has a provision for the order of succession to the
governorship.166 In the event that the governor dies, becomes convicted,
becomes impeached, or resigns, the lieutenant governor becomes the
governor.167 If there is no lieutenant governor, the order of succession is as
follows: the president pro tempore of the senate, the speaker of the house, the
secretary of state, the state auditor, the state treasurer, then the attorney
general.168 There is no reason, in theory, that a similar provision – whether
constitutional or statutory – could not be enacted to provide a similar plan for
the vacancy of the Office of the Lieutenant Governor.
Another alternative method could exist – holding a special election to
fill the position. One state that follows this procedure is New York.169 New
York Public Officers Law Section 42(3) allows the governor to use his or her
discretion to call a special election to fill vacancies in any elective office that
cannot adequately be filled by appointment.170 This solution would allow for
two things to happen. First, the Office of the Lieutenant Governor would be
elected democratically, rather than being appointed by the governor. Second,
if Missouri were to follow New York’s example, those in favor of governor
appointments to fill positions would still be satisfied with an option giving the
governor discretion. Further, it would satisfy the majority’s rule in Cope v.
Parson that a statute would need to provide an alternative method to fill
vacancies. While New York’s statute would make a good example to use,
Missouri’s legislators could consider enacting a rule with more specificity that
gives the governor more or less discretion depending on factors such as how
much time will pass until the next general election.
163. MO. CONST. of 1820, art. IV, § 9.
164. See Journal of the Constitutional Convention of Missouri—1943 (1943).
165. Cope v. Parson, 570 S.W.3d 579, 587 (Mo. 2019) (en banc).
166. MO. CONST. art. IV, § 11(a).
167. Id.
168. Interestingly, the constitutional provision provides the order of
succession if “there be no lieutenant governor,” but there is no similar language
for the other positions listed, including governor, possibly indicating that the lack
of a lieutenant governor was something the drafters expected. Id.
169. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 42(3).
170. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The decision in Cope v. Parson highlights some interesting
constitutional issues. Essentially reading nonexistent language into the
Missouri Constitution, the majority disregarded the explicit plain language of
Section 105.030. Article IV, Section 4 of the Missouri Constitution grants
power to the Governor of Missouri to fill all vacancies unless otherwise
provided by law. Section 105.030 otherwise provided by law by stating in
clear terms that the governor may not fill the Office of the Lieutenant
Governor by appointment. The majority decided such clear language was not
sufficient and instead determined that “unless otherwise provided by law”
means “unless an alternative method is provided.” The Missouri Constitution
makes no such requirements. If the drafters of the Missouri Constitution
wanted to require an alternative method, they would have included such
language as many other states have done. Even within the current framework
set out by the majority, better options than a governor appointment exist.
Missouri could adopt legislation or a constitutional amendment to either
provide a clear order of succession in the case of a vacancy or allow for the
governor to call a special election. Either option would be more democratic
than the one legitimized by the Supreme Court of Missouri in Cope v. Parson.
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